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The Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act
Corporations doing business in several states have long faced the prob-
lem of ancillary receiverships when forced into insolvency. Because of
limited extraterritorial powers of receivers, delinquency has produced a
series of diversified liquidation proceedings, which have in turn wreaked
havoc with the affairs of the company.' Although there has been a vast
improvement in national bankruptcy legislation, with the passage of the
Chandler Act in 1938,2 so that the receivership device has been abandoned
to a large degree by most corporations, insurance companies have been
excluded from the Act.3 Consequently, they must still rely upon receiver-
ship and local statutory substitutes for insolvency proceedings. To cope
with the continued existence of the many problems of decentralization, and
the expense and delay of ancillary receiverships still necessary for insurers,
the Uniform Act was adopted.4 Like most uniform legislation, the Act
attempts to cover a broad field. If it is to be extensively used, it must
afford remedies for problems that have defied solution for a long time. In
order to evaluate its efficiency, therefore, it is necessary to compare the
existing law with the new provisions that are embodied in the Act.
I. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ASSETS
One of the more difficult of the problems 5 which confront the equity
receiver of the defunct corporation is his inability to secure extraterritorial
recognition. The dogma is familiar that "the receiver cannot maintain an
action in his capacity as receiver outside the state of his appointment". 6 But
within the purview of the great majority of the state courts, however, the
privilege to sue has been awarded receivers from other jurisdictions as a
I. Van Schaick, Some Legal Aspects of Insurance Administration (933) 58 A. B.
A. REP. 572, 573 et seq.
2. BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938, 52 STAT. 840, Ix U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1938), amend-
ing BANKRUPTCY ACr OF 1898, 30 STAT. 544 (I898), II U. S. C. A. (1927).
3. Id. at 845, 11 U. S. C. A. §22 (Supp. I938), amending BANKRUPTCY Aer OF
1898 at 547, II U. S. C. A. § 22 (927).
4. UNIFORM INSURERS LIQUIDATION ACT, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF COMMISSIONRS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-
NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE (1939) 232-239, hereafter referred to as the Uniform
Act. Although this act was adopted only July 8, 1939, it has already been enacted by
New York. 27 N. Y. CoNs. LAws (McKinney, 194o) §§ 517-524.
5.. The problems have been exhaustively analyzed by First, Extraterritorial Pow-
ers of Receivers (1932) 27 ILL. L. REV. 271; Laughlin, Extraterritorial Powers of
Receivers (1932) 45 HAxv. L. RE~v. 429; Rose, Extraterritorial Actions by Receivers
(Q933) 17 MINN. L. Ray. 7o4. The need for centralized control has been voiced in the
Annual Report of Special Committee on Equity Receiverships (1927) N. Y. C. BAR
ASS'N 299, 312, 315.
6. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONrLICr OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 509. This doc-
trine has been firmly entrenched in the Federal courts since the renowned case of
Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854). Recognition of a foreign receiver as a
matter of right has likewise been denied by the state courts. See cases cited 3 BEALE,
A TRFATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 1585, n. 2; 1 CLARK, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF REcEvERS (2d ed. 1929) 8o8, n. 193; Rose, note 5 supra, at 717, n. 44. In
order for a receiver to maintain a suit in another jurisdiction as a matter of right, some
other sort of proceeding was essential, whereby, for example, the foreign receiver sued
upon the judgment which he had recovered on a corporate claim, or as a party to the
contract. See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 514; Rose, note 5 supra, at 718-719.
The latter writer points out also that the law has made a distinction between voluntary
and involuntary (possibly statutory) assignments. Such a differentiation illustrates the
extent to which various courts have been carried in their enthusiasm to protect local
creditors. Id. at 706-707. See also Note (1932)-41 YALE L. J. 593, 597-6OO.
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matter of comity in the absence of harm to local creditors.7  Thus, it has
been averred ". . to be in harmony with those legal principles by which
the intercourse of foreign states is regulated for every government, when
its tribunals are appealed to, to render every assistance in its power in
furtherance of the execution of . . . authority (from the appointing
court) . . .".8 On the other hand, a few state courts 9 and the Federal
courts,' 0 with the exception of isolated cases,1 have denied recognition
even on the basis of comity, despite the absence of any consequent incon-
venience to local creditors.
The only alternative, then, was to secure the appointment of an ancil-
lary receiver in each state where either corporate property or a debtor of
the insolvent was located.12  Since such a procedure, necessarily entailing
burdensome expense and delay, is generally considered an action completely
independent of delinquency proceedings in the domiciliary state, 3 a court
of another jurisdiction could withhold recognition even then by refusing
the appointment.' 4 But it is plain that such a refusal would produce a series
of disconnected receivership proceedings '5 and would prevent an orderly
7. See GOODRICH, Op. cit. supra note 6, at 512-5I4; RESTATEMENT, CoNLIIcr OF
LAws (1934) § 564.
8. Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1, 4 (1879). An equally forceful statement ap-
pears in Hardee v. Wilson, 129 Tenn. 512, 518-519, 167 S. W. 475, 477 (1914): "The
privilege of suing in jurisdictions other than that of their appointment is almost uni-
versally conceded to receivers now, as a matter of comity or courtesy, unless such a
suit is inimical to the interest of local creditors . . . or unless such a suit is in con-
travention of the policy of the forum."
9. Murtey v. Allen, 71 Vt. 377, 45 At. 752 (I89) ; Filkins v. Nunnemacher, 8i
Wis. 9i, 9i N. W. 79 (2892) ; see Malone v. Johnson, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 6o4, 6Io, 2oI
S. W. 503, 5o6 (907). This appears to be the old view, as exemplified by HIGH, A
TaEATIsE ON THE LAW OF REcEVES (3d ed. 1894) § 239, which asserts that ". . . the
principles of comity . . . will not warrant a receiver in bringing an action in a for-
eign jurisdiction".
io. Sterret v. Second National Bank, 248 U. S. 73 (I918) ; Great Western Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 56 (I9o5) ; Fowler v. Osgood, 141 Fed. 2o (C. C. A.
8th, 1905). See in addition, cases cited by Rose, note 5 supra, at 71r, n. 2o.
ii. Lewis et ux. v. Clark, 129 Fed. 57o (C. C. A. 9th, I9O4); Lewis v. American
National Stores Co., ii9 Fed. 391 (C. C. E. D. La. i90); Rogers v. Riley, 8o Fed.
759 (C. C. D. Ky. I896). In all three cases, the court permitted suits by foreign re-
ceivers in the absence of domestic creditors and local policy.
22. See First, note 5 supra, at 273; Rose, note 5 supra, at 714; Note (930) 43
H. v. L. Rv. 8o5, 8o6. In regard to domiciliary appointment, there has been some dis-
cussion as to the individual to be designated in that capacity. See Havighurst, Some
Aspects of the Illinois Insurance Code (937) 32 ILL. L. Rur. 391, 407, where the
author asserts the possibility of political pressure. There is present also among ancil-
lary courts the fear of being mere rubber-stamps under the control of the primary court.
It is well, therefore, that the Uniform Act simplifies the rule by specifying the insur-
ance commissioner to serve as receiver. Sec. 2 (1). See note I8 infra. This provision
is desirable also because it eliminates the item of receivers' fees, since the commissioner
is to receive no extra compensation. Likewise, it makes for uniform control and facili-
tates the general administration of the company.
13. Paxton v. McCartney, 103 Ind. App. 697, 6 N. E. (2d) 719 (937). See
GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 585; Rose, note 5 supra, at 714.
14. Bluefields S. S. Co. v. Steele, 284 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); Clark v. Su-
preme Council 0. C. F., 146 Cal. 598, 8o Pac. 931 (i9o5) (where the appointment was
refused because of a prior attachment by a local creditor). See also note 13 supra.
i5. See note (1930) 43 HARV. L. RE. 8o5, 807. Illustrative of this destructive
process in the federal courts is the oft-cited case of Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 72 Fed. 26 (I896), where four distinct sets of receivers, embracing
four circuits and ten districts, were appointed in what was once tersely labelled a
"judicial scandal". On the other hand, however, appears the more rational view of
Mabon v. The Ongley Eiectric Co., 256 N. Y. 196, 5o N. E. 805 (I898), which refused
ancillary appointment, not because of a denial of extraterritorial recognition to the
primary receiver, but rather to avoid unnecessary expense. See also Moscow Fire Ins.
Co. v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 28o N. Y. 286, 2o N. E. (2d) 758 (i939).
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administration. Another objectionable feature of the necessity of securing
ancillary appointment is the fact that the delay involved and the possible
failure to secure such appointment might prevent the receiver from collect-
ing corporate claims, with the result that some debtors would escape pay-
ment.16
This lack of extraterritorial cooperation, disastrous as it inevitably
was, elicited various legislative attempts at reform. The insurance com-
panies, expressly excluded from the Federal Judicial Code,' 7 were aided
somewhat by statutory provisions which vested title in the receiver to all the
insolvent's assets, wherever located.'8 With the added weapon of the
magical "title"-despite much quarreling to be done concerning the appro-
priate theory 1'--the receiver was necessarily, by virtue of the full faith and
credit clause of the Federal Constitution,20 accorded recognition in other
jurisdictions.21 But notwithstanding the presence of a so-called "statutory
successor", it was held in the second Clark v. Williard case 22 to be dis-
cretionary with the court whether a foreign statutory successor will prevail
over local creditors. In other words, the right to sue did not insure control
over local assets, and this without any constitutional objection: "Choice is
uncontrolled as between one policy and the other, so far as the Constitution
of the Nation has any voice upon the subject." 's Apparently, then, each
state, sovereign within its own sphere, has the right to determine its own
policy. Such policy is usually governed by the potency of the desire to
avoid inconvenience and expense to local claimants, as well as the inherent
16. Van Schaick, National Uniformity in Liquidation of Insurance Companies
(1933) PRoc. NAT. CoNy. INS. Comm. ioi. The further problem, namely that ancil-
lary appointment is necessary to prevent valid attachment proceedings, is discussed note
33 1inra.
17. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923). The relevant
portion of the Code is Section 56, 36 STAT. 1io0 (I91), 28 U. S. C. A. H7 (927).
The section provides that where the controversy involved ". . . property of a fixed
character . . . (which) lies within different states in the same judicial circuit .. ",
the receiver of one federal court was ". . . vested with full jurisdiction and control
over all the property within such circuit . . .". That the Karatz case, supra, rep-
resents an arbitrary limitation, see Report of Receivership Committee, note 7 supra, at
314.
18. See, e. g., CAL. CODES, LAWS AND CoxsT. AmEND. (Deering, Supp. 1935) act
3748, § 1ox; Ill. Laws 1937, § 216, p. 789; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, Supp. 1935)
§ 9496.4; 3 MICH. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 12266; 27 N. Y. CONS. LAWS (McKinney,
1939) § 522; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 40, § 2o6; Vt. Laws 1937, no. 188,
§ 6. All of these statutes designate the insurance commissioner or director as receiver
or liqbidator. For a list and discussion of the various types of statutes regulating the
liquidation of insurance companies, see Legis. (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 722, 724-726.
i9. See Laughlin, note 5 supra, at 453 et seq., where the author presents a detailed
analysis of the theory underlying this title-vesting legislation. See also First, note 5
supra, at 283-284; Kearns, Interstate Receivership Practice (1934) 28 ILL. L. REV.
752, 766-767. The pertinent provisions of the Uniform Act are discussed p. 95 infra.
20. U. S. CONST. Art. IV.
21. Clark v. WillIard, 292 U. S. 112 (z934); cf. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S.
243 (1912) (foreign receiver allowed to sue stockholder). See (1933) 19 VA. L. Rv.
649, 65o.
22. 294 U. S. 211 (1935).
23. Id. at 215, where Justice Cardozo made this interesting statement also: "Other
states give the local creditor a free hand, with the result that he may seize what he can
find, though the assets of the debtor are dismembered in the process."
It is important to bear in mind that by virtue of the privileges and immunities
clause, a state cannot prevent a non-resident creditor from filing his claim in that state.
Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 97 Mont. 503, 34 P. (2d) 982 (934). This is certainly
true if the rule of Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898) is of any effect. See Note
(1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 328. See also Mulder and Solomon, Effect of the Chand-
ler Act Upon General Assignments and Compositions (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
763, 779.
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.wish to retain -control over assets within its jurisdiction. 24 When such
considerations will be deemed of sufficient strength to warrant the invoca-
tion of the limitations of the right of the foreign statutory successor likewise
seems to be subject to a very wide latitude.2 5  Manifestly, such a policy
can be carried to disastrous extremes.26  At any rate, the discretionary
power wielded by the courts will be moulded by whatever factor weighs
heavier on the scales of converiience, solicitude for local creditors or a desire
for dispatch in the administration of the defunct corporation. Domination
by the former necessarily tends to defeat the latter.
Such is the situation-uncertain and perplexing-that confronts the
industrious receiver who seeks to administer the affairs of the insolvent in
the most desirable manner, efficiently and equitably. Since the mere inves-
titure of title in the receiver does not insure preference over local cred-
itors, 27 there remained the disturbing likelihood that some few individuals
would-secure full reimbursement, at the expense of proportionately dimin-
ished shares for the others, even though they deserved equal treatment.
To remove this undesirable feature of the existing law, the Uniform Act
provides: "The domiciliary receiver of an insurer domiciled in a reciprocal
state, shall be vested by operation of law with the title to all of the property,
contracts, and rights of action, . . . located in this state. .. , 2s This
section, in conjunction with the clause that gives the domiciliary receiver
of a resident insurer "title to all of the property, . .. ,. wherever located,
* . . and . . . the right to recover the same . . ." 29 will apparently pre-
vent the inequitable preferences that frequently resulted from the courts'
enthusiasm to protect local creditors. 0 By virtue of these reciprocal pro-
24. Note (ig3o) 3o MicH. L. REv. i3, 1326 and n. 20.
25. Id. at 1327-1328 and note 26. Thus it has been held that the mere presence of
local creditors will suffice. Hieronymous Bros. v. China Mutual Ins. Co., 6 Ala. App.
97, 6o So. 452 (1912).
26. See Laughlin, note 5 spra, at 466.
27. See p. 94 supra.
28. Sec. 3 (x). The italicized phrase (italics supplied) would seem to distinguish
this provision from the ordinary statutory language. Under the latter, state X would
be inclined to favor local creditors over a receiver who derives his title from state Y
(see p. 94 and note 23 supra), whereas under the instant statute a receiver from state
Y would be more likely to be recognized in state X since his title comes from state X
itself. For the latter jurisdiction to rule otherwise, would be to stultify itself. Similar
provisions already exist in the laws of three states. Ill. Laws 1937, § 216, p. 789; 27
N. Y. CoNs. LAws (McKinney, i94o) § 519 (2) ; Vt Laws 1937, No. 188, § 6. It is
interesting to note that the statutes of Illinois and Vermont are exact copies of the Uni-
form Act drafted and adopted by the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners
in 1936. PRoc. NAT. CONY. INs. CoUM. (1936) 3o-32. New York, which has since
adopted the Uniform Act, likewise once had the act of the Insurance Commissioners.
27 N. Y. CONS. LAws (McKinney, 1939) §§ 5i7-s24.
Note also, that although the Uniform Act designates the state of incorporation as
the domiciliary state [§ i (5)], there has been some discussion as to the proper situs
for a domiciliary or primary receiver. See Kearns, note i9 supra, at 755 (where the
author distinguishes between real and theoretical domicile).
29. Sec. 2 (2). The further provision in Section 1o, whereby "The domiciliary re-
ceiver of an insurer domiciled in a reciprocal state may sue in this state to recover any
assets . . ." would seem to be of great aid. A parallel provision in existing legisla-
tion reads thus: "The general assets located in this State of a delinquent company dom-
iciled in a reciprocal state shall be administered by the insurance . . . agency of
such reciprocal state . . .. " Ill. Laws 1937, § 218, p. 790; Vt. Laws 1937, No. i88,
§ 8. As to the effect of "title" and the statutory language necessary to vest it, see Note
(932) 30 Micn. L. REv. 1322, 1330-1332.
30. It is important to note, however, that the absence of any express reference to
real property leaves the same doubt that is present under existing law, namely, whether
the investiture of title to the corporate "property" includes land and other immovables.
See 8 Coucn, CYCLOPE:iA OF INsURANCE LAW (1931) 6883; Rose, note 5 supra, at 721;
Van Schaick, loc. cit. supra note 16; Legis. (1935) 48 HARv. L. Ray. 835, 837, n. IT.
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visions, then, there would seem to be no further need for expensive ancillary
proceedings,,' which were formerly necessary not only to insure success
over local creditors,3 2 but also to prevent the latter from securing valid
attachment liens.33
With this unimpeachable power to recover all the property of the
corporation, regardless of its situs, already secured, the domiciliary receiver
is further aided by the power to employ "special deputies" who are empow-
ered to the same extent as, but under the supervision of, the primary
receiver.3 4 This insures a uniform administrative device which in turn
secures the benefit of quickly organized and completely cooperative assist-
ance, and thus centralizes not only control, but also complete responsibility,
in the insurance commissioner, who is designated as the domiciliary re-
ceiver. The elimination of judicial interference, 5 although possibly a
removal of a perhaps wise check upon a political appointee,38 nevertheless
does provide for a quick, easy and inexpensive administration.
A final problem in the administration of a defunct corporation involves
the well-settled rule that the mere appointment of a receiver has no effect
on attachment, garnishment or other similar proceedings in another juris-
diction; 37 appointment of ancillary receivers was essential.38 So it was
that creditors in distant areas, cognizant of the pending insolvency or
actual dissolution of their debtor corporation, by various twists of judicial
process, secured themselves with a lien or some other sort of preference, 9
thus diminishing the fund available for distribution to the remaining claim-
ants. The apparently omnipresent solicitude for local credtors has carried
this doctrine to such an extent as to include liens acquired by attachment
even after the appointment of a foreign receiver. 4 ' The sole form of protec-
The definition of "general assets" in § i (8) of the Uniform Act would seem to be in-
adequate. In view of the uncertainty of the law today, it is submitted that an express
reference to realty would have been more satisfactory in removing this doubt concern-
ing the titles to land in the various states.
31. See p. 99 infra, where it is pointed out that, from the point of view of the claim-
ant, ancillary proceedings are still necessary under the Act.
32. See note 12 supra.
33. Subsequent to ancillary appointment, the corporate property is deemed to be in
custodia legis and exempt from the ordinary judicial processes whereby liens in the
form of attachments, for example, are secured. See RESTATEMENT, CoNFticr OF LAWS
(1934) § 546 and comment c; Rose, note 5 supra, at 714.
34. THE UNIFORM ACT § 2 (3): "- • • he may appoint one or more special deputy
(commissioners) to act for him. ..
A parallel provision exists in those states which have adopted the act proposed by
the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners: they exempt from the prohibi-
tion of 'suits in a reciprocal state against an insurer for whom a liquidator had been
appointed those actions "initiated, or consented to, . . ." by the domiciliary receiver.
Ill. Laws 1937, § 216, p. 790; Vt. Laws 1937, No. 188, § 6.
35. The Act requires the court's approval of all receivership expenses, including
the salaries of all deputies, thus placing ultimate control with the court. THE UNIFORM
AcT § 2 (3).
36. This was suggested in the discussion of the Act before its adoption.
37. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 546.
38. Id. at comment c..
39. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE (1939)
230-23T.
40. Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 97 Mont. 5o3, 34 P. (2d) 982 (I934) (where the
foreign receiver was a statutory successor). This rule has been applied also where
the attaching creditor is a non-resident of the ancillary state. Catlin v. Wilcox Silver-
Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477, 24 N. E. 25o (I889). See note 23 supra. A fortiori, the cred-
itor who attached prior to the appointment of the receiver will prevail. The undesir-
able result from this procedure has been somewhat mitigated by decisions favoring the
foreign receiver where the creditor attaching locally is subject to the jurisdiction of the
appointing court [Gilman v. Ketcham, 84 Wis. 6o, 54 N. W. 395 (1893)], or is deemed
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tion available to a receiver from another jurisdiction was to obtain ancillary
appointment before attachment.41 To cope with this situation, it is provided
that "During the pendency of delinquency proceedings in this or any recip-
rocal state no action or proceeding in the nature of an attachment, garnish-
ment, or execution shall be commenced or maintained in the courts of this
state against the delinquent insurer or its assets. Any lien obtained by any
such action or proceeding within four months prior to the commencement
of any such delinquency proceeding or at any time thereafter shall be void
as against any rights arising in such delinquency proceeding." 42 This will
obviate the danger of any inequitable preference from this source, at least.
But the Act omits any mention of the status of voluntary payments by the
insurer which result in a preference to one or more creditors. By such a
device, an unfair result is still possible.43
Another undesirable feature, however, apparently still remains. No-
where in the Uniform Act is there any provision for some sort of relation
between the domiciliary receiver and the appointment of ancillary receivers.
Section 3 (I) provides for such appointment only upon the application of
either the insurance commissioner or resident claimants of such ancillary
state.4' It would perhaps be better to give the former some voice, if not
control, in the matter of ancillary appointment. Although it is true that
there is basis for close cooperation between the two,45 the very existence of
both might well be unnecessary and avoided.
II. DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS
A further major problem in the liquidation of an insurer is the exist-
ence of various types of claims, scattered as they are, and the concomitant
question of their recognition in a jurisdiction other than that of their origin.
The lack of uniformity among the states as to what claims will be honored
in liquidation is caused by the confused state of the law as to the effect of
insolvency on the rights of policy-holders. 46 Various stages of delinquency
proceedings have been specified as the signal for the tolling of the rights and
to be governed by "notice" of the corporate charter [O'Malley v. Wilson, 182 Ga. 97,
185 S. E. iog (1936)].
41. See note 38 supra.
42. THE UNIFORr Acr § 9. The wording of the last phrase is to provide for the
contingency of the proceeding falling through, in which case all previously secured liens
would revive.
43. It is interesting to compare this portion of the Act with the relevant sections
of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 840, 11 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1938). Section 6o declares
as a voidable preference a transfer (which is broadly defined in Section i) by the
debtor to the creditor within four months of bankruptcy and while the debtor is in-
solvent, if the creditor receiving the payment has reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor is insolvent. Section 67a (i), dealing with the same subject matter as that in
Section 9 of the Uniform Act, is stricter in that insolvency of the debtor is required.
On the other hand, Section 6o makes the Bankruptcy Act broader in its scope because
it includes voluntary payments.
44. Sec. 3 (i) reads: "The [commissioner] (in an ancillary state) shall file a peti-
tion requesting . . . (his) appointment (as ancillary receiver) (a) if he finds that
there are sufficient assets . . . in this state to justify the appointment . . . or (b)
if ten or more persons resident in this state having claims against such insurer file a
[petition] with the [commissioner] requesting the appointment of such ancillary re-
ceiver." Note that it is the commissioner in the ancillary state, and not the domiciliary
receiver, who determines the sufficiency of the assets. See p. 99 infra with regard to
this problem from the point of view of the individual claimant.
45. The Act provides for a certain, unified procedure once the administration has
commenced. §§ 2 (2), (3) and3 (2).
46. See 8 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw (1931) §§ 2042, 2043, 2044.
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liabilities of all interested parties.47  In other words, depending upon the
jurisdiction, insurance policies, representing contingent claims, are consid-
ered cancelled as of the specified time.4 8  And because of this lack of
uniformity among the states when liquidation requires extraterritorial
recognition, the situation arises wherein one policy-holder- will recover for
the loss covered by the policy, whereas another holding the identical policy,
will be denied recognition, merely because he resides in another state. 9 To
eliminate these unfounded preferences among creditors of the same class, the
instant statute has adopted the procedure formerly in operation in New
York.50 It would crystallize the rights and liabilities of the interested
parties-and thus tend towards equality among similarly situated claimants
-wherever located-as of the time of ". . . entry of the order directing
possession to be taken . . .","' with the concurrent provision allowing the
filing of proof of claims "... on or before the last date fixed for the filing
of claims in the domiciliary delinquency proceedings".5 2 The proposed rule
would produce unanimity among the courts as to what claims are provable
in insolvency; the proper decree would have the same effect in one state as
in another.
Still another hindrance to a speedy administration is the question of
the proper procedure, after the determination, as above, of what claims are
provable, for the presentation of claims. Is it essential that a creditor, to
whom is owing just a small sum, notify the domiciliary receiver of his
claims; or would it suffice to present them in the state of his residence; or
would it perhaps even be wise to introduce his claim in every jurisdiction
where delinquency proceedings have been instituted? In view of the
minuteness of the debt, the last suggestion, albeit wise, and its importance
to this claimant notwithstanding, is plainly beyond reach, and to require any
such procedure would be to impose an unfair burden.58 Moreover, although
the law provides that creditors ". . . regardless of where they are domi-
ciled can prove their claims and be paid in any state in which a receiver has
been appointed", 54 there remains the very strong likelihood of there being
no receivership proceedings in either his resident state, or any state nearby.
Such proceedings would undoubtedly be desirable from the point of view
of the claimant, since they would eliminate the expense of traveling to the
47. Thus, the adjudication of insolvency, or a subsequent injunction restraining
further operations, or a decree of dissolution--or even the mere institution of proceed-
ings for such a decree-these several successive steps have been variously designated
as the point at which the rights involved are to crystallize. See Legis. (1933) 33 COL.
L. Rzv. 722, 726; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. g16.
48. In effect, this means that by its insolvency or dissolution, the insurer or its re-
ceiver gives "notice" to policyholders that the company is from then on unable to fulfill
its part of the contract of insurance, the rationale being that such "notice" affords the
various parties with the opportunity to "cover" their investment by securing other in-
surance. See Legis. (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 722, 728; Legis. (1937) 37 COL. L. Rv.
1031, 1034.
49. This is perhaps best illustrated by a hypothetical instance: a policy-holder in
state X, where policies are considered cancelled only upon the actual dissolution of the
company, will be denied his claim by a receiver in state Y, where the corresponding
law decrees such cancellation as of the mere institution of delinquency proceedings,
when the loss occurs in the interim. On the other hand, an individual in state Y, hold-
ing an identical policy, will be allowed recovery. (It is fundamental here that these
various steps are separate and distinct.) See, e. g., Federico Macaroni Mfg. Co. v.
Great Western Fire Ins. Co., 173 La. 905, 139 So. I (1932) ; Frink v. National Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 9o S. C. 544, 74 S. E. 33 (I912).
50. 27 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (McKinney, 1939) §§ 514 (2), 544 (3). Identical pro-
visions still exist in Illinois. See Ill. Laws 1937, § 194, p. 781, and § 209 (3), P. 786.
5I. THE UNrFORm AcT § 2 (2).
52. Id. at §4 (1).
53. See Van Schaick, note i6 supra, at 102.
54. RESTATEMENT, CoNlicr OF LAWS (934) § 552.
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situs of the closest receiver. In fact, the latter procedure might not even
be worthwhile in view of the distance to be traveled as well as the possibility
of there being only a limited amount of assets available there. At any rate,
if he be the only claimant from that area, such proceedings would not be
available under the Uniform Act. 5  Might it not prove more advantageous
to all concerned, then, to provide for some sort of administrative device
whereby such a claim could be considered on a par with all others, without
entailing cumbrous ancilliary proceedings?
Along these lines, the Illinois and Vermont statutes, after affording
claimants with ". . . the privilege of proving their claims in such reciprocal
state", 6 proceed to provide for the isolated individual in the hypothetical
instance given above in this fashion: "The court in charge of the proceeding
in this state shall, if necessary, appoint one or more referees before whom
such claims may be proved in such reciprocal state."57 The contingency
referred to by the clause "if necessary" would seem to be the exact situation
suggested; the result--ample protection for all. Unfortunately, however,
the Uniform Act contains no parallel provisions. It is likewise to be noted
that ancillary proceedings, despite their expense and possible inaccessibility,
are still necessary to enable a claimant to file outside the domiciliary state.
5 8
Manifestly, since the widely scattered operations of insurers are likely to
produce any number of similar instances of isolated creditors, the failure of
the Act to provide the appropriate machinery to cope With this contingency
is indeed to be regretted.
Apparently, then, the Uniform Act merely codifies the existing law
when it provides that ". . . claimants residing in reciprocal states may
file claims either with the ancillary receivers, if any, in their respective
states, or with the domiciliary receiver". 9  There is, however, no mention
of what law is to govern the rules of provability. To adopt the principle of
the Restatement on the Conflict of Laws, that "the manner in which (and
time within which) a claim can be proved in a state is determined by the
law of that state",60 is to defeat the express purpose of the Act.61 Since
creditors are enabled to file and prove claims in any state wherein an ancil-
lary liquidator has been appointed, it would follow that the terms of such
filing and proof would vary directly with the laws of each state. It is plain
that such a procedure would militate against the attainment of the desired
equality. Rather should the domiciliary substantive law prevail, with indi-
vidual local hearings when required.6 2  Even more desirable, however,
would be a provision for a system of uniform rules of provability. Although
the adoption of the suggested interpretation of the statute would subject
all claimants to similar consideration, there is no reason why the chance
choice of the insurer's domicile should determine the appropriate rules in
the event of the company's insolvency.
63
55. Sec. 3 (i) is reproduced in note 44 supra.
56. Ill. Laws '937, § 212, p. 789; Vt. Laws 1937, No. I88, § 2.
57. Ibid. Although this procedure involves a certain amount of expense, it is pa-
tently less costly than ancillary appointment.
58. Sec. 4 (i) reads: ". . claimants residing in reciprocal states may file claims
. with the ancillary receiver, if any, in their respective states . . . " Further-
more, the provision in § 2 (3) for "special deputies" does not seem to be of any aid in
this instance.
59. Sec. 4.
6o. (1934) § 555 (time) and § 556 (manner).
61. Sec. 12: "This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it." Similar "uniform
purpose" clauses appear in the three states already often cited. Ill. Laws 1937, § 219,
p. 790; 27 N. Y. Cors. LAWS (McKinney, 1940) § 517; Vt. Laws r937, No. i88, § i.
62. Legis. (937) 37 CoL L. REv. 1031, 1034.
63. Ibid.
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A final aspect of the problem of the determination of claims involves
the policy of many courts, prompted by the convenience of centralized
administration and the consequent diminished delay and expense,64 to remit
the corporate assets within their borders to the insurer's domicile.65  Such
a procedure would apparently eliminate the inequitable preferences that
flowed from solicitude for local creditors. It would seem that a claimant
need only present his demands to an ancillary receiver,6 6 who would then
transfer the assets along with the proofs of claim, to the primary state,
there to be administered as part of the entire fund. Closer analysis, how-
ever, erases any illusion of a panacea. Although the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Blake v. MCClung 67 insures a creditor of pro rata
participation irrespective of where he proves his claim, it is nevertheless
likewise true that one state might require new proof, despite any allowance
in another jurisdiction.68 And it is more than likely that a court that is
imbued with an enthusiasm for local creditors will refuse remittance,6 9 even
though it is in the best interests of the estate to secure as speedy an admin-
istration as is compatible with the desire to do equity.70 Illustrative of this
narrow view is a Pennsylvania case,1 where the court refused to remit
funds to the primary receiver until locally domiciled creditors had been paid
in full, non constat that such a ruling would seem to create an unconstitu-
tional preference. 72 Or, rather than administer the estate themselves,
various ancillary courts will transmit the assets under their control to the
domiciliary state only upon the acceptance of certain conditions which are
calculated to secure the desired degree of protection for those who have
filed their claims locally.7 8 In one instance the receiving court refused its
64. See Report of Receivership Committee, note 5 supra, at 314; Note (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 757, 759.
65. GLENN, LI QUmATiON (1935) § 595 (where the author distinguishes state and
federal practice); RESTATEmENr, CoNFLcIT OF LAWS (I934) §§ 553 (where the rule is
stated to apply ". . even though local creditors have presented their claims".),
545 (2) (court will remit if it is ". . . conducive to the convenient settling of the
estate").
66. The need for ancillary receivers and the concomitant problems are discussed pp.
94 (from the point of view of the administration of the estate) and 99 supra (from
the point of view of the individual claimant).
67. 172 U. S. 239 (i898) declaring unconstitutional a Tennessee statute which set
up as a condition to foreign companies doing business in that state a preference for local
creditors. See note 23 supra. See also, in connection with "retaliatory" legislation,
(1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 433, 435.
68. Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 848.
6i. Clark v. Painted Post Lumber Co., 89 N. J. Eq. 409, 104 Atl. 728 (1918)
(where the court deemed a threatened discrimination sufficient). A more desirable
view was taken in O'Malley v. Wilson, 182 Ga. 97, 185 S. E. 1o9 (1936) ; the court
brushed such reasoning aside in the absence of concrete evidence. On the other hand,
where the refusal is based on some valid reason of convenience or necessity, it would
seem to be proper. See Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 757, 759.
70. Report of Receivership Committee, note 5 supra, at 316.
71. Frowert v. Blank, 205 Pa. 299, 54 Ati. OO (19o3).
72. Under the "equal protection" clause as interpreted in Blake v. McClung, 172
U. S. 239 (1898). See note 67 supra.
73. Commissioner of Insurance v. National Life Ins. Co., 280 Mich. 344, 273 N. W.
592 (I937), where the court held that the ancillary court could affix any condition it
desired to the remittance (the case involved a government tax lien). However, remit-
tance, though discretionary, cannot be refused aribtrarily. Southern B. & L. Ass'n v.
Miller, 118 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 4 th, i9o2). Yet some of the restrictions imposed are
rather onerous. Drury v. Doherty, 127 Misc. 263, 215 N. Y. Supp. 613 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
On other occasions, the apparent purpose of the remitting court is to afford valid and
desirable protection to domestic claimants. Buswell v. Supreme Sitting of Order of
Iron Hall, 16I Mass. 224, 36 N. E. io65 (1894) (pro rata distribution required) ; Mat-
ter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.) 242 N. Y. 148, 151 N. E. 159 (1926) (where
the foreign receiver was in a foreign country and -the claims were relatively small) ;
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ieceiver the permission to acquiesce to any such terms; 74 patently the result
was inimical to all concerned.7 5 Still another court saw the problem as
requiring the exercise of the court's sound discretion under the peculiar
facts of each case.78 To solidify these diverse views into one rule, the
Uniform Act states that "the final allowance of such claim (of a resident of
a reciprocal state) by the courts in the ancillary state shall be accepted in
this state as conclusive as to.its amount, and . . . as to its priority, . . -.77
There is, of course, a companion provision with respect to resident claimants
of a non-domiciliary corporation.7 8  Within the purview of such an enact-
ment, once his claim has been proved, a creditor need feel no qualms as to
its reception in another state. Likewise, a court need experience no trepi-
dation concerning the welfare of its local creditors as it transmits assets to
the primary receiver in another state.
III. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ASSETS
With the administrative machinery thus prepared, the next chrono-
logical step in the proceedings is the actual distribution of the assets.
Involved here is the question of priorities among the various claimants, and
once more the pertinent statutes of the individual states are replete with
varying rules.79 For example, only four jurisdictions recognize a prefer-.
ence in the case of workmen's compensation claims.8 0 . In others, wages,
taxes and other government claims are given priority."' The jurisdictional
controversy involved in these diversities is brought clearly into perspective
by the realization that the tendency appears to be to deny recognition to
these preferences beyond the situs of their orgiin.8 2 Thus it has been held
that the statutory preference accorded workmen's compensation claims is
available only to those whose claims arise within the enacting state. 3 Uni-
formity is achieved under the instant statute by the provision for determi-
nation of preferences by the laws of the domiciliary state,8 4 in conjunction
with the stipulation, "All such claims whether owing to residents or non-
residents shall be given equal priority of payment from general assets
regardless of where such assets are located." 89 However, setting up the law
Brunner v. York Bridge Co., 78 W. Va. 702, 9o S. E. 233 (1916) (sending claimants
to the foreign receiver would have been burdensome). For a discussion of the various
phases of this problem, in the light of the decided cases, see First, note 5 supra at 277;
Kearns, note ig supra, at 770-772, and n. 62; Legis. (_935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 835, 842-
843.
74. Bank Commissioner v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 7o N. H. 557, 49 Atl.
124 (xgo).
75. Cf. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 286, 2o
N. E. (2d) 758 (1939).
76. Sands v. Greely, 88 Fed. 13o (C. C. A. 2d, I898); see Laughlin, note 5 supra,
at 445-446. See also note 72 supra.
77. Sec. 4 (2). It is desired to point out once more that the necessity of ancillary
appointment, although some of its defects have been eliminated, yet remains.
78. Sec. 5 (2).
79. Legis. (937) 37 Co.. L. REv. 1o31, 1O35.
8o. Id. at n. 35.
81. In re taxes, see (1935) io TuL. L. REv. z49. Another type of priority, estab-
lished by judicial process rather than by statute, is the so-called "six-months rule" in
connection with supply claims in railroad receiverships. See (1934) 34 COL. L. Rv.
230.
82. See Van Schaick, note 16 supra, at 1o3.
83. See Legis. (937) 37 COL. L. REv. IO3I, IO36 and n. 36.
84. THE UNrFORM AcT § 6 (2). Similar provisions are to be found in Ill. Laws
1937, § 213, P. 789; 27 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (McKinney, 194o) § 5 (I); Vt. Laws 1937,
No. 188, §3.
85. THE UNIFORm AcT § 6 (.
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of the domiciliary state as the basis of the rules of preference is subject to
the same criticism directed at it as supplying the rules of provability.88 As
there, so here, a uniform system for the regulation of priority, regardless
of the state of incorporation, would appear to be more satisfactory.
Another troublesome aspect of this phase of the problem involves that
portion of the Act dealing with priority of secured claims. Section 8 pro-
vides for the operation of the so-called Bankruptcy Rule, to the effect that
a creditor can liquidate his security-whether it be a mortgage, pledge,
etc.-and then claim the deficiency in the distribution of the general assets
"on the same basis" as unsecured creditors.8s  It is a difficult question as
to whether this gives each claimant the full value of his diligence in obtain-
ing some sort of security.""
But the Act sets up a different rule for that type of secured claim
which consists of the special deposits required of foreign insurers by statutes
in every state.8 9 Although it is generally agreed that such a fund constitutes
a trust for the benefit of the specified class of policy-holders, 0 difficulty
arises when the claimant attempts to procure reimbursement for the de-
ficiency. Each state had its own policy with regard to this matter, with the
result that similarly deserving creditors received varying degrees of satis-
faction. In view of the fact that these deposits were felt to be unscientifi-
cally conceived and so generally unimportant with reference to the insurer's
ordinary operations, the Uniform Commissioners decided that they would
not be treated on the same level as individual secured claims. Consequently,
Section 7 provides that the holder of a special deposit claim does not par-
ticipate in the general distribution until the unsecured creditor has received
a share equal pro rata to the amount produced by the lien representing the
security. 91"
86. See note 84 supra.
87. The identical section is in force in New York. 27 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (McKin-
ney, 194o) § 522 (4). This so-called "Bankruptcy Rule", as distinguished from the re-
ceivership rule, is defined in § 57 (h) of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 StAr. 866 (1938), 1I
U. S. C. A. § 93 (h) (938).
With regard to the amount of the deficiency, § 8 provides it to be conclusive as ad-
judicated in ancillary proceedings or any other proceedings "in which the domiciliary re-
ceiver has had notice and opportunity to be heard". Although one of the earlier drafts
of the Act reserved the determination of the amount of delinquency to the domiciliary
receiver, it was subsequently realized that this, in effect, nullified the value of the ancil-
lary proceedings. As it now reads, the section solves the problems of extraterritorial
recognition as a valid claim of the balance that remains after the resort to the various
securities has decimated the local assets.
88. It has been asserted that making the creditor resort to his security first and
then sue for the deficiency deprives him of the benefits to be obtained by the reverse
process. See Note (1923) 8 MINN. L. REv. 232.
89. The statutes are collected and discussed in I CoucH, op. cit. supra note 46,
§ 245a.
go. 8 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 46, at 6692. Consequently the specified group is
preferred as to payment from that fund. Ibid.; GooDicIr, op. cit. supra note 6, at 521.
See THE UNinaR ACr §7; Ill. Laws 1937, §215 (2) (c), p. 289; 27 N. Y. CoNs.
LAws (McKinney, Ig4o) § 522 (3) ; Vt. Laws i937, No. i88, § 5 (c). Before New
York adopted the Uniform Act, it was decided that the Bankruptcy Rule prevailed. In
re Southern Surety Co., 282 N. Y. 54, 24 N. E. (2d) 845 (1939) ; (194o) 88 U. oF PA.
L. Ray. ioi8.
9I. ". . . such sharing (for deficiency on a special deposit claim) shall be de-
ferred until general creditors, and also claimants against other special deposits who
have received smaller percentages from their respective special deposits, have been
paid percentages of their claims equal to the percentage paid from the special deposit."
This is the so-called "Kentucky Rule". It, as well as the other possible bases of
recovery, are discussed by Hanson, The Secured Creditor's Share of an Insolvent Estate
(1936) 34 MIcH. L. REV. 309.
Illinois and Vermont provide that "... unsecured creditors shall be preferred to
secured creditors to the extent necessary to equalize the advantage gained by virtue of
such security". Ill. Laws 1937, § 215 (i), p. 789; Vt. Laws 1937, No. i88, § 5.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In its various aspects, the Uniform Act has endeavored to delve into
and solve the numerous problems inherent in the liquidation of an interstate
insurance company. A summary of the remarks above indicates that in
some vital spots, as for example with regard to the inferior position of the
small isolated claimant, or the lack of control by the domiciliary receiver
over ancillary proceedings, the Act has not fulfilled its purpose. On the
other hand, it has stopped up many of the gaps in the law formerly so
productive of uncertain and unfair results. Thus, the domiciliary receiver
need no longer seek ancillary appointment to assure himself of control over
all assets, wherever located. Nor need there be any fear of various creditors
securing some sort of judgment lien to the exclusion of other similarly
situated claimants.
A. final survey reveals that the Act fails to mention the highly contro-
versial issue of jurisdiction over receivership proceedings among and
between state and federal courts.92 Several more recent decisions by the
Supreme Court of the United States 91 indicate a trend towards imposing
most of the burden of the process of liquidation on the state courts, where
it would seem to be more aptly treated. Possibilities of limitations on this
tendency, on the other hand, 4 would perhaps warrant an outline somewhere
in the Uniform Act of some sort of procedural device which would tend
to produce a more harmonious relationship between the courts of the state
and federal systems. Universal adoption of the Act would then insure
greater cooperation throughout the delinquency proceedings.
This criticism, however, along with the several others that have been
ventured, does not destroy the value of the proposed statute. On the con-
trary, in both substance and form it seems well equipped to remedy the
patent defects that menace the structure underlying the extraterritorial
operations of receivers and liquidation proceedings. More harmonious
cooperation among states and between state and federal courts is essential,
not only to enable the receiver to administer the affairs of the insurer with
dispatch and precision, but also to enable him to award claimants with the
full value of their demands, without subjecting either to undue hardship.
Perhaps, on the other hand, the problem is ". . . peculiarly one to be
handled under the provisions of a federal statute", 5 and it is indeed to be
wondered why the insurance company should not be included in the Bank-
ruptcy Act itself.96 In the meantime, despite the sentiment that ". . . uni-
form state legislation is no more than a Utopian dream","7 adoption of the
Uniform Act is strongly urged not as a panacea, but rather as a measure to
accomplish a great deal in the facilitation of the liquidation-with all its
concomitant problems--of interstate insurers.
L.R.
92. For a general discussion of these problems, see GLENN, LIQUIIATION (1935)
§ 58o; Shirley, Conflicting Jurisdiction in the Appointment of Receivers (1938) 16 TEnx.
L. REv. 471; Notes (1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 70, (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 805, (935)
45 HARV. L. Rr-v. 1400, (1937) 24 VA. L. REV. 79.
93. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S. 189
(1934); Gordon v. Ominsky, 294 U. S. 186 (1934); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294
U. S. 176 (1934).
94. See Note (1935) 48 HAmv. L. REv. 1400, 1407.
95. Van Schaick, note 16 supra, at 1o4.
96. The reason for the original exclusion of insurers was the feeling that the state
courts, better acquainted with the basically local nature of the business, could best
handle them. Patently a mere cursory view of the extensive operations of the large
insurance companies dispels the validity of any such assertion.
97. Van Schaick, note i6 supra, at io4.
